Using a statistical methodology guided only by data and based on a genetic algorithm, we select the best econometric model for explaining the determinants of the size of the shadow economy, its main determinants being: taxes on capital gains of individuals, corporate taxes on income, profits and capital gains, domestic credit, bank secrecy, ethnic fractionalization, urban population, globalization, corruption and the socialist legal origin of country.
I. Introduction
The determinants of the shadow economy remain controversial (see Schneider and Enste, 2000 , for a survey).
Using the massive database gathered by Thiessen (2010) , the main contribution of our paper consists of selecting the determinants of the size of the shadow economy from a set of 274 variables suggested in the theoretical and empirical literature as potential causes and influences. We employ a purely statistical methodology which automatically selects the factors in the econometric model in a process guided only by data. Our methodology properly handles multicollinearity problems in the estimations that could arise due to the redundancy of the information provided by the factors. Besides, it offers a parsimonious model of the shadow economy, containing few factors with as much information as possible that captures the essential characteristics of the data, and can help in identifying the main reasons explaining its size.
II. Methodology
In order to avoid data mining problems for constructing the best econometric model explaining the empirical determinants of the size of the shadow economy, we follow the general to specific approach based on the theory of reduction (Hendry, 1995) . It means that given an endogenous variable Y, which represents the indicator of the shadow economy, and a set 1 ,...., K X X of 274 potential factors explaining it, the problem that we face is finding the best sub-model of the form: , ...., 1, 2,..., , 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 10 . In order to resolve this intractable problem, we follow the heuristic strategy proposed by Hoover and Perez (1999) by searching all the feasible reduction paths when simplifying the general model. In particular, we use the methodology developed in Acosta-González and Fernández-Rodríguez (2007) . This is a procedure for automatic selection of factors in the model, guided only by the data, which is carried out using a Genetic Algorithm where the lost function is the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC, henceforth) . This methodology avoids the tendency to overidentify models detected in several popular heuristic methods for selecting models [like stepwise, Lovell (1983) ] and, by allowing all possible combinations of potential determinants, renders results that are robust to any specification.
Therefore, starting with a large number of potential causes and an indicator of the shadow economy considered in the literature to take into account all the information about its possible determinants, our methodology selects the best econometric model, in the sense of the SIC.
The SIC advises choosing the econometric model which minimizes the expression 
III. Data and empirical results
We use the database gathered by Thiessen (2010) We find a significant positive association between the shadow economy and taxes on income, profits and capital gains (as a percentage of GDP), suggesting that these have a negative impact on the decisions made by economic agents on whether to operate officially, driving entrepreneurs and businesses underground 3 .
The results of the regressions in Table 1 show that domestic credit (as a percentage of GDP) significantly influences the size of the hidden economy. This is consistent with the fact that although domestic credit is positively and significantly correlated with business and entry density rates, due to burdensome regulations, high marginal tax rates, the absence of monitoring and compliance (of both registration and tax regulations), and other weaknesses in the business environment, many firms might find it optimal to evade regulations and operate in the informal sector (Klapper et al., 2008) .
A strongly significant negative influence is also shown with regard to the bank secrecy dummy (1 = bank secrecy law is relatively effective; 0 = no bank secrecy law or not effective The ethnic fractionalization index shows a significant negative influence on the size of the informal economy, in line with Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) , who document that a high degree of ethnic fractionalization has negative effects on investment and increases rent seeking activities.
With regard to urban population, our result is consistent with that of Elgin and Oyvaty (2013) , who argue that although the share of the informal sector grows in the early phases of urbanizaton due to several pull and push factors (see. Smith, and Scarpaci, 2010) , it tends to decrease in the latter phases of urbanization.
Concerning globalization, increasing competition in goods and factor markets raises uncertainty of income and employment, increasing the size of the shadow economy (Karlinger, 2009) . Moreover the development of the networking-based economy has given birth to a large group of shadow enterprises, making the concept of national boundaries and distance for certain economic activities meaningless (Shangquan, 2000) .
In relation to corruption, our finding supports the view that corruption and the shadow economy are complements in high income countries and thus, a substitute for the official economy as suggested by Johnson et al. (1997) and Hindriks et al. (1999) 4 . 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w Finally, we detect a significant and positive influence for a dummy indicating that the legal origin of the country is socialist, suggesting that the legacy of high degree of bureaucratic discretion; undeveloped market institutions and enforcement mechanisms, and low degree of economic liberalization would have adversely influenced formal activity (Eilat and Zinnes, 2002) .
Turning to the goodness of fit, the value of the R-squared statistic reported in Table 1 suggests the relative success of our regression model in predicting the shadow economy within the sample.
[ Table 1 ]
IV.Conclussion
We have empirically examined the determinants of the size of the shadow economy using a statistical methodology guided only by data and based on a genetic algorithm.
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